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1 Introduction
After the Montreal Protocol on the protection of the ozone layer, the Oslo
Protocol on the regulation of transboundary air pollution, the Kyoto Pro-
tocol on greenhouse gases entered into force last February.1 The entry into
force of those international environmental agreements (IEA) constitutes an
achievement that many political skeptics had dismissed as impossible.2 Ab-
sent a supranational authority able to bind countries to build an IEA, the
making of and the participation to agreements is indeed at the entire dis-
cretion of each country. Entry into force is all the more difficult that when
countries eventually elaborate a protocol, this latter to enter into force needs
to comply with ratification requirements. Signatories rejecting domestically
the protocol by not ratifying weaken therefore the IEA.3
Explaining the making of a self-enforcing IEA has been and remains
an ongoing research topic. Theoretical contributions tend indeed to prove
that IEA made of more than three countries are unstable since most coun-
tries would prefer to do nothing and rely on the efforts made by counter-
parts —e.g., Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), or more recently
Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2005). Sanctions, side payments and issue
linkage were first explored in order to explain cooperation. While sanctions
to deter free riding were proved to be non credible (Hoel (1992), Barrett
(1994, 1999)) side payments and issue linkage proved to help the making
of cooperation but under restrictive conditions —Carraro and Siniscalco
(1993), Barrett (1997, 2001), Hoel and Schneider (1997) or Conconi and
Peroni (2001). Lately, the focus is mostly put on representation of asymme-
tries between countries. Intuition tells indeed that asymmetries might be a
sufficient condition to deter the free riders bearing important damages. We
1For an exhaustive list of the international protocol which entered into force see
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/multi/multiabout.html.
2In the text, we will consider the terms “protocol”, “agreement” and “treaty” as syn-
onymous.
3For an overview of ratification thresholds stipulated —see for instance Article 25 of the
Kyoto protocol (1997), Article 16 of the Ozone Layer Montreal protocol (1987), Article 15
of the Oslo Sulphur protocol on acid rain (1994), the NOX protocol (1988) or the VOC
protocol (1991).
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propose in this paper an alternative explanation of the making of IEA keep-
ing the symmetric assumption but modifying slightly the rule of the game.
More precisely, we characterize the range of feasible stable IEA, keeping the
simple payoff formulation of Barrett (1994) but taking into account two spe-
cific aspects of the IEA game, namely the nature of the abatement bound
commitment and the ratification threshold ruling the entry into force of the
agreement.
The first aspect we focus on is the nature of the abatement target. Ac-
cording to the United Nations terminology, a protocol is an instrument with
substantive obligations that implements the general objectives of a previ-
ous Convention. As such, participation to an environmental protocol on
gas pollution translates in a commitment to abate at least some amount
of emission. That is, participation to a protocol means that abatement
levels cannot be below some minimal bound.4 Furthermore, it is implic-
itly assumed in the IEA literature that abatement target is an optimum.
Cooperating countries are supposed to choose an abatement target that
maximizes their joint welfare given emissions of the IEA outsiders, while it
appears that in most protocols the target is not meant to be an optimum but
simply aims at ensuring a large participation (see Grubb et al., 1999). We
propose therefore to abandon the welfarist approach and to study instead
the minimum abatement bound commitment which allows for the making
of a stable agreement. In fact, the only requirement is that the abatement
bound commitment needs to be higher than abatement in the absence of
IEA. Committing countries then choose their own abatement levels, which
might well be higher than the agreed bound. The idea is hence to look at
the problem the other way around and to focus on participation rather than
on efficiency. The setting we consider is purely non cooperative. Countries
are concerned solely by their own abatement target and associated welfare
rather than by the abatement level and welfare of a possible cooperative
coalition. Transfers or flexibility mechanisms are therefore not permitted.5
4For instance, Article 3 of the Kyoto protocol stipulates that countries are bounded to
reduce their overall emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 5% below the 1990 levels by
2008-2012.
5Note however that if flexibility mechanisms are realized ex-post to the agreement,
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The second aspect we focus on is the dynamics of agreement formation.
We pay specific attention to the condition for an agreement to enter into
force. Recall that the making of an IEA is made of three successive stages.
The first is the elaboration and the signature of a protocol. It consists of
agreeing on a target (i.e., an abatement bound) and on an entry into force
rule (i.e., a ratification threshold). The second is the ratification of that
protocol. National authorities endorse it and legally commit to respect the
protocol target as soon as the entry into force rule is fulfilled. The third
is the entry into force. If the threshold rule is fulfilled, countries set their
abatement levels given the abatement bound they committed to. Existing
literature on self-enforcing agreements pays little attention to that dynam-
ics, focusing on the last stage and implicitly assuming that an IEA enters
into force if endorsed by at least two countries.6 An IEA is then formed as
soon as it is stable meaning that no country has an incentive to get in or out
of the IEA. Distinctly, we assume that a country’s third stage decision has
to comply with the prescriptions of the protocol only if it has ratified the
agreement and if the number of countries having done so is at least as high
as the ratification threshold. If the number of signatories ratifying is below
the threshold, the agreement is null and void and even ratifying countries
quit their commitment.7 As a consequence, we do not model explicitly the
as stipulated for instance in the Kyoto Protocol, these last would be necessarily Pareto
improving.
6These models consider that the set of countries entering in the agreement choose
their abatement levels so as to maximize the sum of their utilities (note that this implies
that target is determined endogenously by the number of countries participating to the
agreement). When there is only one country, its choice coincides with his best-reply, which
implies that the abatement level is the same as the one without agreement.
7Note that the use of minimal participation threshold to implement public good has
already been studied in the literature. For instance, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) show
that the use of such participation threshold is sufficient to implement Core allocations. In
the same vein and applying it to IEA negotiation, Currarini and Tulkens (2003) analyse
the allocation rule allowing the existence of the making of efficient agreement given that
ratification threshold constraint is to be fulfilled. Kohnz (2004) analyses the IEA game in
a non cooperative setting. The approach followed is however distinct than our since she
studies the problem under the angle of contract theory considering asymmetric information
between agents with linear utilities.
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first stage but focus on the interplay between the second and the third stage.
More precisely, we analyze the relation between threshold and abatement
target in order to characterize the set of all IEA that can enter into force.
Given an agreement (a minimal abatement level and a ratification thresh-
old), we consider a two-stage game where countries decide first to ratify or
not and second to choose an abatement levels higher or equal to the abate-
ment bound they committed to. We study the subgame perfect equilibria of
this game, which turn out to be equivalent to the internal-external stability
concept usually employed in this literature. The introduction of ratification
mechanism proves not only to constitute a sufficient condition to explain
the making of a large IEA, but also provides a natural justification for the
use of the internal-external stability concept adopted by Carraro and Sinis-
calco (1993), Barrett (1994) and their successors. Hence, the ratification
rule which is usually interpreted as a constraint to cooperation enforcement
is shown to have positive feedbacks on this latter. Besides ensuring the en-
try into force of the protocol, the ratification threshold also turns out to
determine the size of the cooperative coalition. We characterize the set of
IEA that can enter into force and give conditions under which the maxi-
mization of the welfare (of the signatories of the IEA) coincides with the
maximization of total abatement level.
The paper is organized as follow. We present in Section 2 the model. In
Section 3 we describe the ratification game and provide conditions on the
abatement bound and the ratification threshold for an agreement to enter
into force. In Section 4 we analyze the interplay between the countries’
welfare and the total abatement level, and conclude in Section 5. Most of
the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Preliminaries
We consider a (finite) set of n identical countries, N = {1, . . . , n}, where
each country i has to choose an abatement level of stock of pollutant, qi.
We call this situation the abatement game. For the sake of simplicity, we
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assume that for each country i ∈ N the range of possible abatement levels
is defined by Xi = [0,∞). We denote by q the vector of abatement levels,
i.e., q = (qi)i∈N and by Q the aggregate abatement level, Q =
∑
j∈N qj .
We assume abatement is a public good with congestion. In other words,
abatement allows to avoid global environmental damages and therefore ben-
efits each country symmetrically but whenever drastic levels are attained, it
also annihilates the functioning of the international economy. The benefit
from avoiding damage can thus be partially overcome by a negative effect
on trade.8 Precisely, when the aggregate abatement level is Q, country i
gets
Pi(Q) = aQ− 12Q
2 .
where a is a positive parameter.
Abatement is also individually costly in the sense that each country pays
the cost of its own abatement level. The more a country abate the more it
will be marginally costly. The cost function of country i is therefore
Ci(qi) =
c
2
q2i .
where c is a positive parameter.
For a given vector of abatement the net payoff of country i is then given
by the following equation,9
ui(q) = Pi(Q)− Ci(qi) = aQ− 12Q
2 − c
2
q2i . (1)
As usual, we write q−i to denote the (n−1)-dimensional vector (qh)h∈N\{i} .
The abatement game has a unique equilibrium, in which each country chooses
the same abatement level, q0,
q0 =
a
n+ c
. (2)
8Note, however, that most of our results carry over if we model total abatement as a
public good without congestion.
9A similar formulation was proposed initially by Barrett (1994). Alternatively we
could consider a model in which countries choose their level of emissions of pollutant.
Diamantoudi and Sartzetakis (2003) show that these two approach are equivalent for the
class of payoffs considered in this paper.
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This yields the following utility level
u0 = ui(q0) =
a2(n2 + 2nc− c2)
2(n+ c)2
. (3)
where q0 = (q0, . . . , q0).
2.2 The restricted abatement game
Traditionally, the literature on environmental agreements defines an IEA as a
set of countries choosing jointly their abatement levels. This contrasts with
most international treaties where an IEA is better considered as a target
and an entry into force mechanism. In this paper we shall consider this
latter approach. For expositional ease however, we restrict in this section
to the definition usually employed in the literature, i.e. where an IEA is
just a proposal of an abatement level. Later in the paper we shall broaden
our definition of an IEA introducing a ratification threshold. Restricting to
the target of an IEA and not considering the entry into force mechanism
allows us to focus on some basic characteristics of IEA such as countries
best response and IEA’s effectiveness.
Because we assume that countries are symmetric, imposing the same
lower bound on abatement levels for countries participating to the IEA is
a natural assumption. Hence, we shall consider throughout the paper only
values of α such that α > q0.10
The main issue is then whether countries will follow the recommenda-
tions of the IEA. From a strategic point of view, the participation to an
IEA consists of an alteration of one’s strategy set in the abatement game,
in which case we shall talk about the restricted abatement game. More pre-
cisely, the possible levels of abatement of a country i participating to an
IEA will be XIEAi ,
XIEAi (α) = [α,∞) ,
10As explained in the Introduction, we consider the choice of the value α is a secondary
issue. Our main purpose in this paper is to characterize the different levels of α that
allows for the existence of a stable IEA. Later in the paper we use our characterization of
the set of admissible values of α to give some insights about which value is more likely to
be chosen, depending on the objective of the signatories of an IEA, i.e., maximizing the
total abatement level or the welfare of the signatories of the IEA.
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and if it does not participate, its attainable abatement levels are unchanged,
i.e., Xi = [0,∞). Whenever no confusion can occur we shall omit the term α
in the strategy set of a country member of the IEA and write XIEAi instead
of XIEAi (α).
While strategy sets are affected when there is an IEA (for the participant
countries only), the payoffs are not affected. Observe that from a formal
point of view, the situation with an IEA defines a different game than the
situation without an IEA presented at the beginning of this section.11 To
keep things simple we shall abuse notation and use the same payoff function
described in equation (1) to denote the payoffs of the game with an IEA and
without an IEA.
Since the participation to an IEA bounds the choices available to a coun-
try, its strategic behavior will be affected. First, observe that the payoff
function of each country i ∈ N is continuous in q and strictly quasi-concave
in qi. It follows that each country’s best-reply is continuous and single val-
ued. For a country not participating to the IEA, its best reply is defined as
follows,
BRi(q−i) = {qi ∈ Xi : ui(qi, q−i) ≥ ui(q′i, q−i) for all q′i ∈ Xi}.
Because qi must belong to Xi for all i ∈ N , we thus have
BRi(q−i) = max
{
a−∑j 6=i qj
1 + c
; 0
}
.
Consider now the case of a country, say i, participating to an IEA. In
this case the best-reply, denoted bri, is defined as follows,12
bri(x−i) = {qi ∈ XIEAi : ui(qi, q−i) ≥ ui(q′i, q−i) for all q′i ∈ qi}.
As shown by Bade et al. (2005), the function bri can be easily charac-
terized from the function BRi and the bound α.13
11The main difference between the case without an IEA is the domain of the payoff
functions. Without an IEA, the domain of each country’s payoff function is
∏
i∈N Xi
while with an IEA the domain becomes
∏
i∈S X
IEA
i ×
∏
i∈N\S Xi.
12Note that since the domain of the best-reply bri depends on the set of strategies of
all other countries, and thus on the set of countries participating to the IEA, we should
write brX
IEA
i instead of bri.
13Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005) give a characterization of the restricted best reply
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Lemma 1 (Bade, Haeringer and Renou (2005)) Let ui be continuous
and strictly quasi-concave in qi for all i ∈ N . Let Xi = [0,∞) and XIEAi =
[α,∞). Then,
bri(q−i) =
α if BRi(q−i) < αBRi(q−i) if α ≤ BRi(q−i)
Lemma 1 simply says that whenever a country’s best response is to
choose an abatement level higher than α, the country is free to do so. How-
ever, if the best response consists of choosing an abatement level lower than
α, then the country chooses an abatement level equal to α. While this result
seems obvious, it is worth to note that it may not hold if the payoff func-
tions are not strictly quasi-concave. Because we look at a model in which
countries choose an abatement level, only a minimal abatement level is rel-
evant —see Bade et al. for a statement of this result when a country has a
minimal and a maximal abatement level.
Given an IEA, the main issue we address in this paper is to find out
how many countries will follow the IEA’s recommendation. To answer this
question, we first characterize the equilibria of the restricted abatement
games, for any number of countries participating to the IEA. Denoting by
subscript s the signatory countries and by subscript ns the non-signatories
countries, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let α > q0 and let S be a coalition of countries that follow
the IEA’s recommendation, i.e., restrict their attainable abatement levels to
[α,∞), and let s = ]S. Then there is a unique equilibrium in the abatement
game in which each signatory country chooses an abatement level equal to
qs(s) = α and each non-signatory country chooses qns(s) where,
qns(s) =

a− sα
c+ n− s if s ≤
a
α
,
0 otherwise.
(4)
whenever the original and the constrained strategy sets are both compact and convex
subsets of the real line (which includes for instance the case when the IEA also imposes
an upper bound) and payoff functions are strictly quasi-concave. The Lemma presented
here can be easily deduced from the Lemma presented in Bade et al.
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By Proposition 1, all countries participating to an IEA (resp. not partic-
ipating) can be treated symmetrically. It follows that all what matters when
computing the payoffs of a country is the size of the IEA and whether or not
the country participates to the IEA. For the sake of simplicity, we shall then
write u(s, 1) to denote the payoff of a country participating to an IEA with s
countries, u(s, 0) the payoff when the country is not participating to an IEA
which contains s countries. When there is no IEA the payoff of a country
will be simply denoted u(0), and we write u(n) to denote a country’s payoff
when the IEA involves all countries.
Perhaps the most basic question regarding an IEA is its effectiveness,
that is, whether an IEA increases the total abatement level. When an IEA
forms, all countries following the IEA’s recommendation will abate more
than what they would abate without the IEA (α > q0 by assumption).
However, according to Proposition 1, countries not participating to the IEA
will abate qns(s) which is always below q0. In spite of this, we can show that
as long as the abatement level of each countries form an equilibrium (i.e.,
abatement levels are given by Proposition 1), an IEA always increases the
total abatement level. This result holds irrespective of the stability of the
IEA. To see this, let α be a minimal abatement level imposed by the IEA
and suppose that there are t countries following the IEA’s recommendation.
Suppose first that t < a/α. According to Proposition 1, the total abatement
is Q(t), where
Q(t) = (n− t)qns(t) + tα = a(n− t) + αtc
c+ n− t .
When there is no IEA, the total abatement level is Q(0),
Q(0) = nq(0) =
na
n+ c
.
It suffices then to compare both Q(t) and Q(0). We then obtain
a(n− t) + αtc
c+ n− t >
an
c+ n
⇔ α > a
c+ n
.
By assumption the second inequality is always satisfied. If, on the contrary
we have t ≥ a/α then qns(t) = 0, and thus Q(t) ≥ a. Because an > a/(n+c),
we then have the following result,
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Proposition 2 For any IEA, the total abatement is higher than that ob-
tained without IEA.
3 The IEA game
3.1 The game
We have seen in the previous section that given a minimal abatement level α
and a number of countries committing not to abate less than α, abatement
levels and payoffs are uniquely determined. What remains to be done in
order to explain the making of IEA is to know how many countries will
commit to a minimal bound on their abatement levels.
To this end, we consider the following two-stage game with perfect infor-
mation between each stage. The first stage consists of the ratification stage,
where countries choose simultaneously between two actions, R, for ratify-
ing, and NR, for not ratifying. In the second stage, all countries choose
simultaneously an abatement level.
The ratification of an IEA by a country can be interpreted here as a
conditional commitment from the country to participate to the IEA. This
conditionality comes from the presence of a ratification threshold, t, which
consists of the minimal number of countries ratifying the agreement for the
IEA to enter into force. It is the combination of each country’s decision
in the first stage and the ratification threshold that will determine which
restricted abatement game is played in the second stage. If i is a country
choosing NR in the first stage then its second stage action is Xi = [0,∞).
Suppose now that country i chooses R in the first stage, and denote by T
the set of all countries, including i, that choose R in the first stage. The
action set of country i in the second stage is defined as follows:
Xi =
XIEAi = [α,∞) if ]T ≥ t ,Xi = [0,∞) otherwise .
Ratification of the agreement by a country is then a binding decision
because if a country has ratified the IEA it cannot choose an abatement
level below α. Yet, this decision is conditional on the fact that at least t− 1
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other countries also ratified the agreement. We then say that the agreement
enters into force if it has been ratified by at least t countries. We can now
give a formal definition of an IEA,
Definition 1 An International Environmental Agreement (IEA) is a pro-
posal to put a lower bound α on countries’ abatement levels, where α > q0,
and a ratification threshold t.
Without ratification threshold, a country ratifying the agreement is in-
deed restricting its abatement levels to be higher or equal to α. This implies
that the absence of a ratification threshold is equivalent to setting this latter
to be equal to 1.
3.2 Stability
A natural equilibrium concept to use given our framework is subgame per-
fection. Because for any number of countries participating to the IEA the
equilibrium in the restricted abatement game always exits and because coun-
tries’ first stage action sets are finite we easily deduce that a subgame perfect
equilibrium always exists.
Traditionally, the literature has focused on a stability concept originally
introduced by d’Aspremont et al. (1983) in the literature on cartels. This
stability concept is the combination of two stability requirements, called
respectively internal and external stability. According to this concept, a
coalition S is said to be internally stable if no country in S has an incentive
to leave the coalition, and it is said to be externally stable if no country
outside S has an incentive to join the coalition. A coalition S is stable if it is
both internally and externally stable. Subgame perfection in our framework
turns out to be equivalent to internal and external stability if one defines
as the coalition the set of countries participating to the IEA. Indeed, at a
subgame perfect equilibrium, no country ratifying wants to change its first-
stage action by deciding not to ratify. Similarly, a country not ratifying
does not have an incentive to change its first-stage action by ratifying the
IEA. In other words, the choice of ratifying vs. not ratifying translates into
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a choice of staying in or staying out of the coalition of countries respecting
the IEA’s recommendation.
It could be argued that the use of the internal-external stability con-
cept is not well justified when the issue is that of making an environmental
agreement. While the requirement that no country participating to an IEA
wants to withdraw seems natural (the internal stability), imposing that non-
signatories cannot join the IEA is difficult to justify (the external stability).
Since the entry of another country increases the total abatement level, why
should we impose external stability? As a comparison, we can observe that
international organizations like the WTO have the objective to integrate as
many countries as possible, i.e., the entry of a new member is considered as
a desirable outcome. In this paper we take a different route. Starting from
a sequential game (induced by our ratification mechanism), we analyze sub-
game perfect equilibria, the most sensible concept for such type of games.
Because our model establishes an equivalence between the internal-external
stability concept and the first stage actions of a subgame perfect equilib-
rium, the ratification mechanism we propose can therefore also be seen as a
strategic justification for the use of the internal-stability concept.
We should note, however, that the existence of a subgame perfect equi-
librium (and therefore of a stable coalition) is not sufficient to ensure that
the IEA will enter into force. An IEA also needs to be ratified by at least
t countries, i.e. ratification threshold requirement. For this reason, by a
stable coalition (or stable IEA) we shall always refer to a group of countries
choosing R in the first stage such that its size is greater or equal to the
ratification threshold t.
3.3 Stability without ratification threshold
We first consider the case when no ratification threshold is mentioned in the
protocol. Note that the absence of ratification clause is in fact equivalent
to the case in which the ratification threshold is set to 1, for a country
decision to follow the IEA’s recommendation is binding, independently of
the decision of the other countries. To begin with, we show that it is not
possible to have a stable IEA including all countries.
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Proposition 3 For any α > q0, there is no stable IEA with n members.
This result is not surprising. Indeed, since an IEA induces participants
to choose a non-Nash abatement level, there is always one country who
wishes to deviate. Since by Proposition 1 the abatement level chosen by
non-deviating participant will be constrained (i.e., remain α), the deviating
country will be the only one able to fully adjust his abatement level, and
attain his best-reply. Perhaps more surprising is that the same results also
holds for any number of countries ratifying the IEA, Indeed, if there are
already some countries not participating to the IEA, the abatement levels of
these countries will change if one participating country decides to withdraw
from the IEA. In this case, the abatement level chosen by a country i with-
drawing from the IEA will not be its best response against the abatement
levels of all other countries when i was still participating to the IEA. Rather,
it will be the outcome of a new equilibrium.
Proposition 4 For any s ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is no stable IEA with s coun-
tries.
Without a stabilization mechanism, Proposition 4 shows that there is
no hope to obtain a stable IEA, thereby suggesting that an international
agreement should not only consists of a target about abatement levels but
also a mechanism regulating entry into force.14 We show in the next section
that imposing a ratification threshold greater than 1 is a natural mechanism
to ensure entry into force of stable IEA’s.
3.4 Stability with ratification threshold
We now consider the case of a non-trivial ratification threshold, i.e., t ≥ 2.
We first look for conditions under which there is a threshold t∗ such that
a stable agreement exists. To do so, we study conditions for the payoff
14This result can appear striking to the readers familiar with that literature. One could
indeed intuitively expect that a coalition of at least two countries is eventually stable.
Remind however that alternatively to the papers in the vein of Barrett (1994), we assume
that countries participating to the IEA do not consider the join payoff of the coalition but
simply their own payoff.
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obtained by a country ratifying the IEA when it has also been ratified by
t∗ − 1 other countries is greater than the payoff when the agreement is not
ratified, i.e., studying whether the set Z(α) = {s ≤ n | u(s, 1) − u(0) ≥ 0}
is non-empty. It turns out that the existence of stable IEA’s is greatly
facilitated by observing that there is never over-ratification,
Proposition 5 Suppose that (t, α) is a stable IEA. Then there is no equi-
librium in which more than t countries ratify the IEA.
This result is a direct consequence of Proposition 4. More precisely,
suppose that t′ countries ratify the IEA and t′ > t, where t is the ratification
threshold. Consider now a country ratifying, and hold the strategy of the
other countries fixed. In this case, this country receives a payoff equal to
u(t′, 1). If it decides not to ratify, then it will receive a payoff equal to u(t′−
1, 0). According to Proposition 4, we must have that u(t′, 1) < u(t′ − 1, 0).
Hence, whenever there is over-ratification some ratifying countries have an
incentive to withdraw from the agreement. On the contrary, when there
are just t countries ratifying, a country participating to the IEA compares
u(t, 1) with u0, where u0 is the Nash equilibrium payoff of the abatement
game without IEA. This is so because if the country opts for not ratifying
the number of countries ratifying will be below the threshold t and thus we
reach the situation when there is no IEA. The next result gives a necessary
and sufficient condition on the minimal abatement level α to ensure the
existence of a stable IEA for some threshold t.
Proposition 6 There exists a threshold t∗ such that a stable IEA exists if
and only if α ≤ α, where α = q0
√
1 + c.
We say that a ratification threshold t is admissible if there exists an
abatement level α such that t ∈ Z(α). Similarly, a minimal abatement level
α is admissible if α ∈ (q0, q0
√
1 + c].15
15It is important to note that the maximal value of abatement given by Proposition 6
does not yield, in principle, to a stable IEA. The reason is that the bound α = q0
√
1 + c
may not be sufficiently high to ensure that there is an integer such that u(t, 1) ≥ u(0) —
although we know that when considering the trivial abatement level α = q0 there exists a
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Another observation we can make about the set of stable IEA’s is that
it is not necessarily unique, although its size is uniquely determined by
the ratification threshold. That is, if t is an admissible threshold then there
exists n!/(n−t)!t! distinct stable coalitions. It is worth to note however that
for a given value of abatement level α there might exists several admissible
thresholds. If α ≤ q0
√
1 + c then any threshold between t(α) and t(α) is
admissible, where t(α) and t(α) are the solution of the following programs,
t(α) = argmint∈{0,...,n}u(t, 1)− u(0) (5)
such that u(t, 1)− u(0) ≥ 0
t(α) = argmaxt∈{0,...,n}u(t, 1)− u(0) (6)
such that u(t, 1)− u(0) ≥ 0
It follows that whenever α ≤ q0
√
1 + c any threshold t ∈ [t(α), t(α)] is
admissible. An extreme case is when t is set to n. In this case, we obtain the
obvious result that any Pareto improvement is attainable in a stable IEA
involving all countries.16 One may then wonder why some agreements do
not fix an abatement level that maximizes the collective welfare and set a
ratification threshold equal to n. First, one can assume that requiring unan-
imous ratification could be too demanding, thereby decreasing the likelihood
that the IEA enters into force. Second, Proposition 4 shows that there are
strong incentives to free ride. That is, for any abatement level, each country
would prefer to have a ratification threshold strictly below n and be one
of the countries not ratifying. Hence, although a stable IEA involving all
countries is theoretically plausible, the negotiation may lead to a threshold
lower than n.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the abatement level maximizing the
welfare of the grand coalition (when the threshold is set to equal n) is lower
than the maximal abatement level α. To see this, note that when t = n the
welfare of the grand coalition is maximized when α = an/(n2 + c), which
can be shown to be lower than α.
stable IEA for any ratification threshold t. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider in
the remaining of the paper that α is such that there is an integer t∗ such that u(t, 1) > u(0).
16By any Pareto improvement we mean any choice of α such that all countries choosing
the abatement level α makes them better off compared to the Nash equilibrium level q0.
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4 Welfare
The question of welfare improvement of an IEA is also quickly eluded. Let
t∗ be an admissible ratification threshold. By Proposition 5, any stable IEA
contains s∗ = t∗ countries. By the stability of the IEA, we then have
u(t∗, 1) ≥ u0 .
Hence, all countries forming part of the IEA are better off compared to the
situation without the IEA. Furthermore, since the benefit of abatement is
shared by all countries and only the cost of abatement is country-specific,
we have,
∀ t = 1, . . . , n, u(t, 0) > u(t, 1) .
Combining this two previous observations we then have the following result,
Proposition 7 A stable IEA is always welfare improving for all countries,
for any admissible ratification threshold.
Let us now focus on the interplay between the welfare of signatories of
an IEA, the ratification threshold and the equilibrium total abatement level.
While an IEA benefits the environment and the welfare of all countries, it
turns out that the maximization of the environmental impact (i.e. mini-
mization of the damage) is not necessarily equivalent to the maximization
of the signatories’ welfare. It appears that this friction between these two
objectives comes from the choice of the ratification threshold.
We first characterize the agreements that maximizes the total abatement
level. Let α be an admissible minimal abatement level. It follows that for
any threshold t ∈ [t(α), t(α)] there is an equilibrium in which only s countries
ratify, yielding the total abatement Q(s),
Q(s) = (n− s) a− sα
c+ n− s + sα .
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To facilitate the analysis, let g(s) be the differentiable mapping from R to
R such that g(s) = (n− s) a−sαc+n−s + sα.17 Differentiating we obtain
g′(s) =
c(α(n+ c)− a)
(−c− n+ s)2
Since α > a/(n + c), g′(s) > 0 for any s. We then have the following
Proposition,
Proposition 8 Let α be an admissible level of abatement. The total abate-
ment is maximized when the ratification threshold is set to t(α).
Note that if the negotiated threshold is chosen so as to maximize the
environmental impact, i.e. set to t(α), then the welfare of the signatories
is very close to their welfare without IEA.18 It turns out that for a given
abatement level α, the ratification threshold that maximizes the welfare of
signatories (at equilibrium, and provided that the IEA enters into force) is
not necessary the same as the one maximizing total abatement.
Proposition 9 Let α be an admissible level of abatement. The welfare of
ratifying countries is maximized when the ratification threshold is set to tˆ(α),
where
tˆ(α) =

a
α
if n ≥ c√
1 + c− 1 ,
n otherwise .
The combination of Propositions 8 and 9 shows that, given a minimal
abatement level α, the maximization of the welfare of the signatories is not
necessarily at odds with the maximization of the total abatement. This is
the case whenever n <
c√
1 + c− 1 . Indeed, from the definition of t(α), this
can only be the case when tˆ(α) = n. Whenever n is too large, tˆ(α) 6= n,
the maximal global abatement level is not a corollary of the maximization
of the signatories’ welfare . Finally, observe that since a/α is decreasing in
α, the higher is the minimal abatement level required by the IEA, the less
17Since Q(s) is defined over integers we need to define a new function, which “coincide”
with Q(s), that is differentiable. Another way, albeit more tedious, would be to compute
Q(s)−Q(s− 1).
18Recall that by definition, t(α) is the highest integer such that u(t(α), 1) ≥ u(0).
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likely it is that the maximization of the signatories’ welfare coincides with
the maximization of the total abatement.
Yet, whenever t(α) 6= tˆ(α) we get the surprising result that whenever
the ratification threshold is set to maximize the signatories’ welfare, the
total abatement in equilibrium is independent of the minimal level α, To see
this, note that t(α) 6= tˆ(α) implies that tˆ(α) = a/α. Setting the ratification
threshold to be equal to tˆ(α), the total abatement in equilibrium is then
a(n− tˆ(α)) + αtˆ(α)c
c+ n− tˆ(α) =
a(n− tˆ(α) + c)
c+ n− tˆ(α) = a .
If c is high enough, α is such that there are as many stable and welfare
maximizing IEA’s as there are integers between a/q0 and a/α. The differ-
ence between each of them is the distribution of the burden. Since global
abatement of the coalition is unchanged, a low α would allow large coalition
to be stable while a high α would make difficult the entry into force of the
agreement.
5 Conclusion
We show in this paper that far to hurt cooperation, a ratification mechanism
allows for the entry into force of an IEA. Since it is always worth for a
country to be the outsider of an existing IEA, ratification threshold rule
binds countries at the margin to join the agreement. Indeed if an IEA
enters into force, its size equals the threshold. While this enables us to give
a sharp prediction regarding the number of countries participating in the
IEA, it also shows how fragile are such agreements. Any country ratifying
the IEA becomes pivotal, meaning that its non-ratification is sufficient to
collapse the entire IEA. We show nevertheless that a large typology of IEA
can enter into force. In particular, a set of welfare maximizing IEA as well as
a set of environmentally maximizing IEA are characterized. It appears that
according to the abatement bound and the threshold rule bargained, the IEA
which will enter into force will stick to that bound and that threshold. Put
differently, abatements will equal the bound and size will equal the threshold.
It follows that the bound and the threshold bargained fully characterize the
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IEA which eventually enters into force.
An aspect rather new in the paper regards the meaning of cooperation.
By cooperating, we assume that countries commit simply to abate at the
least an agreed target which does not need to maximize the joint welfare
of the cooperative coalition. In that respect, our approach is purely non
cooperative since countries do only care about their own welfare.19 This
assumption, besides its accuracy with regards to the IEA which entered into
force in the past, admits the advantage of providing a simpler game formula-
tion than what had been done so far. Henceforth, the game we deliberately
enunciate as simple as possible by keeping the symmetry assumption, is eas-
ily tractable with asymmetries in the benefit and cost functions. One can
also easily conceive to solve that game considering asymmetric abatement
targets, a task currently underway.
19Such assumption does not prevent the ex-post introduction of efficiency mechanisms
such as joint implementation or tradeable permits. Such mechanisms if introduced later
will eventually be pareto improving.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 Let S be the set of countries restricted by the
IEA. Suppose first that (s, α) is such that a − sα ≥ 0. We first show that
for all i ∈ S, the unique equilibrium is such that qi = α. Let qˆ = (qˆh)h∈N be
an equilibrium of the abatement game with s countries signing the IEA and
suppose there is a country participating to the IEA, say i, such that qˆi 6= α.
If follows by Lemma 1 that qˆi = BRi(qˆ−i). Let j denote any country not
participating to the IEA, i.e., qˆj = BRj(qˆ−j). Let Qˆ−ij =
∑
h 6=i,j qˆh. We
then have
qˆi =
a− Qˆ−ij − qˆj
1 + c
(7)
qˆj =
a− Qˆ−ij − qˆi
1 + c
(8)
Solving (7) and (8) we then find that qˆi = qˆj . Repeating this for all countries
not participating to the IEA, and because qˆi ≥ α, we have
qˆh ≥ α, ∀ h ∈ N . (9)
Let j be any country not participating to the IEA. Because qˆ−j ≥ (n− 1)α,
we have
qˆj =
a− qˆ−j
1 + c
<
a− (n− 1)α
1 + c
. (10)
Moreover, observe that α > a/(n+ c) implies that
α >
a− (n− 1)α
1 + c
. (11)
Combining Eqs. (10) and (11) we obtain that country j’s best reply is to
choose an abatement level strictly lower than α, a contradiction with Eq.
(9).
Hence, all countries participating to the IEA choose an abatement level
equal to α. The abatement game reduces then to a game with n− s players,
where the payoffs functions are given by
∀ i ∈ N−, ui(q) = (a(sα+Qns)− 12(sα+Qns)
2)− c
2
q2i , (12)
where N− is the set of countries not participating to the IEA, and Qns =∑
h∈N− qh. It is easy to see that this game admits a unique Nash equilib-
rium in which all countries (not participating to the IEA) would choose an
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abatement level equal to qns(s) = (a − sα)/(c + n − s). Because sα < a,
qns(s) ∈ Xi, for all i ∈ S.
Suppose now that (s, α) is such that a−sα < 0. It follows that qns(s) = 0.
We claim that in this case the unique equilibrium is then q∗ such that q∗i = α
for all i ∈ S and q∗i = 0 if i /∈ S. Because qi ∈ [α,∞) for i ∈ S, we have∑
i∈S qi ≥ sα, and thus Q−j =
∑
i∈N\j qi ≥ sα for all j /∈ S. Recall that
the best reply of a country j /∈ S is q∗j = max{(a−Q−j)/(1 + c); 0}, which
implies that q∗j = 0. Consider now i ∈ S, and suppose that q∗i 6= α. If follows
by Lemma 1 that q∗i = BRi(q
∗
−i). Since for all j ∈ S we have qj ≥ α, country
i’s original best reply is bounded, i.e., BRi(q∗−i) ≤ (a − (s − 1)α)/(1 + c).
To show that we must have q∗i = α it suffices to show that BRi(q
∗
−i) ≤ α,
and thus that (a − (s − 1)α)/(1 + c) < α. This inequality is equivalent to
α > a/(c+ s). Since α > q0 = a/(c+ n) and s ≤ n, the result follows. 
Proof of Proposition 3 Let S be the coalition of countries constrained
by the IEA. By Proposition 1 the abatement level chosen by each participant
is equal to α. Suppose now that one country, say i, decides to withdraw
from the IEA. Again by Proposition 1, the abatement level chosen by the
remaining participants will be equal to α, and that of country i will be
equal to (a − (n − 1)α)/(1 + c), i.e., BRi((n − 1)α). Since (qh = α)h∈N
is not a Nash equilibrium of the (unrestricted) abatement game, we have
ui(BRi((n− 1)α), (n− 1)α) > ui(α, (n− 1)α). That is, country i is strictly
better off withdrawing from the IEA. 
Proof of Proposition 4 If there is no stable IEA with one or more
countries then it must be that the IEA game has a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium in which all countries choose NR in the first stage. Hence, it
suffices to show that for any α > q0 and s = 1, . . . , n, u(s, 1) < u(s− 1, 0).
Consider first the case where s and α are such that sα < a. ¿From
Proposition 1 it follows that qns(s) > 0. Let ∆(α, s) = u(s− 1, 0)− u(s, 1),
which yields,
∆(α, s) = − c
2(c+ n− s)2(1 + c+ n− s)2(αc− a+ αn)(A+ αB) (13)
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Where
A = a(n2− 2sn− c2− c+ s2)
B = n3 + 3cn2− 4n2s+ 2n2− 6cns+ 3cn+ 3c2n+ 5s2n
− 4sn+ c2 + 3s2c− 2sc+ 2s2− 2c2s+ c3− 2s3 .
Observe that ∆ is a polynomial in α of degree 2, whose roots are
r1 =
a
c+ n
, r2 = −A
B
.
Computing r1 − r2 we obtain,
r1 − r2 = A(c+ n) + aB(c+ n)B =
(s− n)(s− c− n)(s− c− n− 1)
(c+ n)B
Because s ≤ n, r1 > r2 if and only if B < 0. Moreover, the coefficient of
α2 in ∆ is equal to B(c + n), implying that ∆ is convex (resp. concave) if
B > 0 (resp. B < 0). Since α > r1, ∆(α, s) > 0 for any s whenever B > 0.
If B < 0 then r1 < r2 and ∆(α, s) > 0 for any α ∈ (r1, r2), which completes
the proof of the Proposition.
Suppose now that sα > a, and let i be a country that does not ratify the
IEA. Let Q(s) = (n− s)qns(s) + (s− 1)α and Q(n− s) = (n− s− 1)qns(s−
1) + (s− 1)α. From Proposition 1 qs(s) = qs(s− 1) = α, and qns(s− 1) = 0
or qns(s− 1) = (a− sα)/(c+ n− s).
Suppose first that qns(s − 1) = 0. Hence, it must be the case that
(s − 1)α ≥ a, which implies that Q(s) > q(s − 1) ≥ α. Therefore, we have
aQ(s− 1)− 12Q(s− 1)2 > aQ(s)− 12Q(s)2. Adding the cost of abatement,
qns(s− 1) and α respectively, we obtain aQ(s− 1)− 12Q(s− 1)2 > aQ(s)−
1
2Q(s)2 − c2α2, which is tantamount to u(s − 1, 0) > u(s, 1), the desired
result.
Consider now the case when qns(s− 1) > 0. It follows that (s− 1)α < a,
and thus s ∈ [a/α, a/α+1]. We now show that u(s−1, 0) is minimized when
s = a/α. First, observe that the total abatement Q(s− 1) < a if and only if
(s − 1)α < a. Hence, Q(s − 1) is increasing in s and takes its lowest value
when s = a/α. The abatement of a country not ratifying qns(s− 1) is also a
decreasing function of s, which implies that c/2qns(s−1)2 is maximized when
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s− 1 = a/α − 1. Therefore, u(s− 1, 0) ≥ u(a/α, 0). Furthermore, s > a/α
implies that Q(s) ≥ a, and thus we have u(s, 1) ≤ u(α, 1) = 12(a2 − α2).
Computing ∆ = u(s− 1, 0)− u(s, 1), we obtain
∆ ≥ cα2 (a2− α(2a(n+ c+ 1)− α((c+ n)2 + c+ 2n)))
2(a− cα− nα− α)2
To show that ∆ > 0, it suffices to show that the following holds true,
α >
2a(n+ c+ 1)
(c+ n)2 + c+ 2n
. (14)
Consider now the following inequality,
a
c+ n
>
2a(n+ c+ 1)
(c+ n)2 + c+ 2n
. (15)
Because α > a/(c + n), Eq. (15) being true implies that (14) is true as
well. Now, it is readily verified that Eq. (15) always holds true (the above
inequality simplifies to n > 0), and thus we have u(s− 1, 0) > u(s, 1), which
completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 6 Let ∆ = u(s, 1) − u(0). Suppose first that
qns(s) 6= 0, i.e., non-ratifying countries are not constrained. Since α > q0,
it is convenient to pose α = βq0 with β being a parameter strictly greater
than 1. Simplifying we then obtain:
∆ = − a
2c
2(c+ n− s)2(n+ c)2 (−X + Y + β(βX − Y )) (16)
where
X = 2nc+ cs2 − 2sc+ n2 + s2 − 2ns+ c2
Y = 2c2s+ 2cns
Consider now the function f(s) : R→ R with f(s) = −X+Y +β(βX−Y ).
Observe that the sign of f(s) is the opposite of the sign of ∆. Furthermore,
the mapping f(s) is a polynomial of degree 2, such that the coefficient of s2
is equal to (1 + c)(β2 − 1), which implies that ∆ > 0 whenever s ∈ (s1, s2)
where s1 and s2 are the two roots of f(s),
s1 =
(1 + c+ β −
√
c+ c2 − cβ2)(n+ c)
βc+ β + c+ 1
(17)
s2 =
(1 + c+ β +
√
c+ c2 − cβ2)(n+ c)
βc+ β + c+ 1
(18)
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s1, s2 ∈ R if and only if β ≤
√
1 + c , the desired result.
Suppose now that qns(s) = 0, i.e., s > a/α. In this case the total
abatement is equal to a if s countries ratify, which gives the following payoff,
u(s, 1) =
1
2
(a2− α2) ,
Substracting u(0) to u(s, 1) we obtain
∆ =
c(ca2− α2n2− 2cα2n− c2α2 + a2)
2(n+ c)2
∆ is positive if and only if α ∈ (−q0
√
1 + c, q0
√
1 + c), which completes the
proof of the Proposition. 
Proof of Proposition 9 Consider the difference u(s, 1)− u(0) given by
Eq. (16). Abusing notation, let d(s) be the differentiable mapping from [0, n]
to R such that d(s) = − a2c
2(c+n−s)2(n+c)2 f(s), where f(s) is the polynomial
function defined in the proof of Proposition 6. Differentiating by s we obtain,
d′(s) = −c
2(a− nα− cα)(a− sα)
(c+ n− s)3
d′(s) is thus strictly positive if and only if s < aα . Given that d(s) is contin-
uous, the function reaches its maximum when s = aα .
It remains to show that there exists some admissible values of α such
that a/α ≤ n or, equivalently, α ≥ a/n. From Proposition 6, α is admissible
only if α ≤ ac+n
√
1 + c. Hence, if suffices to show that
a
c+ n
√
1 + c ≥ a/n .
Simplifying we obtain the following condition,
n ≥ c√
1 + c− 1 . (19)
Hence, whenever Eq. (19) holds true, the threshold maximizing the welfare
is equal to aα . Otherwise, the threshold maximizing the welfare is equal to
n. 
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